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Abstract
This paper deals with the optimal provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model, when
the consumers have present-biased preferences due to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The results show that
the preference for immediate gratiﬁcation facing the (mimicking) high-ability type weakens the incentive
to adjust the public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, numerous studies have reported strong evidence suggesting that people and animals
have "present-biased" preferences, i.e. a tendency to give less weight to the future welfare consequences of
today’s actions than would be optimal for the individual himself/herself in a longer time-perspective (see, e.g.,
Thaler, 1981; Mazur, 1987; Kirby, 1997; Viscusi, Huber and Bell, 2008; Brown, Chua and Camerer, 2009).
Present-biased preferences might be exempliﬁed by quasi-hyperbolic discounting, where the individual, at
any time t, attaches a higher utility discount rate to tradeoﬀs between periods t and t + 1 than to similar
tradeoﬀs in the more distant future. Viscusi, Huber and Bell (2008) have studied discounting of the beneﬁts
attached to a public good, exempliﬁed by water quality. Based on a representative U.S. sample of 2,914
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1respondents, they estimate the "quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameter" (referred to as "β" below) to be in
the interval 0.48-0.61. This suggests that the weight given to beneﬁts in period t + 1, relative to beneﬁts in
period t, is roughly half of the weight that consumers in period t give to beneﬁts in period t + 2 relative to
beneﬁts in period t + 1.
The purpose of this short paper is to examine how a paternalistic government would modify the policy
rule for public provision in response to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We focus on a state-variable public
good, as many real world public goods, such as, e.g., diﬀerent aspects of environmental quality, have this
particular character. Our study is based on an overlapping generations (OLG) model with two ability-types,
where each individual lives for three periods (the minimum number of periods to address quasi-hyperbolic
discounting). The government is assumed to carry out redistribution under asymmetric information by means
of nonlinear labor and capital income taxation as well as provide the state-variable public good referred to
above. Therefore, our concern will be to study the supplemental role of public provision when the income
taxes are optimal.
2 The Model and Main Results
Consider an OLG economy where each consumer lives for three periods; works in the ﬁrst two and becomes
a pensioner in the third. Each generation consists of two consumer-types: a low-ability type earning wage
rate wl
t and a high-ability type earning wage rate wh
t > wl
t in period t. The instantaneous utility faced by





where c denotes consumption of a numeraire good, z leisure and G the public good. The age indicator,
a, takes the value 0, 1 and 2, if the consumer is young, middle-aged and old, respectively. When young
and middle-aged, leisure is given by a time endowment less the hours of work, i.e. zi
0,t = H − ￿i
0,t and
zi
1,t+1 = H − ￿i
1,t+1, whereas all time is spent on leisure when old, so zi
2,t+2 = H, for i = l,h. The









where Θt = 1/(1 + θ)
t is a conventional exponential discount factor with utility discount rate θ (the same
for everybody), whereas β
i ∈ (0,1) is a type-speciﬁc and time-inconsistent preference for immediate gratiﬁ-
cation.1
Let s denote saving and r the interest rate. We abstract from bequests, meaning that the intial wealth
of each consumer is zero. The budget constraint faced by ability-type i of generation t can then be written
1It would add no important insight into the consequences of quasi-hyperbolic discounting if we were to assume that the
















1,t+1[1 + rt+2] − Ti
2,t+2 = ci
2,t+2 (5)




represent the income tax payments made when young, middle-aged and old, respectively, which are nonlinear
functions of income. Although the optimal use of income taxation will not be examined here, we assume
that the income tax system is ﬂexible in the sense of allowing the government to control, the consumption,
labor supply and savings behavior of each ability-type.2
To simplify, we follow much earlier literature in assuming that output is produced by a linear technology,
which is interpreted to mean that the factor prices (wage rates and interest rate) are exogenous.
The public good evolves according to the following diﬀerence equation;
Gt = gt + δGt−1, (6)
where gt is the incremental provision (or investment in the public good) in period t, while δ ∈ (0,1) represents
the depreciation factor.
Turning to public policy, our concern is to analyze the optimal provision of the state-variable public good
when decided upon by a paternalistic government; therefore, we assume that β
l = β
h = 1 from the point
of view of the government.3 The objective of the government is represented by a utilitarian social welfare
















The informational assumptions are conventional: the government can observe labor and capital income,
whereas ability is private information. We focus on the "normal case", where the government attempts to
redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type. As a consequence, the government must prevent
2Aronsson and Sjögren (2009) analyze the optimal use of income and commodity taxation by a paternalistic government
when the consumers apply quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
3This assumption is in line with earlier comparable literature on optimal paternalism; see, e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2003, 2006) and Aronsson and Thunström (2008).
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0,t denotes the utility of the mimicker. We assume that an individual who reveals himself/herself
to be a high-ability type when young cannot credibly pretend to be a low-ability type when middle-aged,
which means that the decision of whether or not to become a mimicker is taken by the young high-ability
type. The mimicker faces the same income-consumption combinations as the low-ability type; however, as
the mimicker is more productive, he/she spends more time on leisure than the low-ability type.













+ Kt(1 + rt) − Kt+1 − ptgt = 0, (10)
where Kt is the capital stock at the beginning of period t, and pt is a ﬁxed marginal cost of public provision
interpretable as the marginal rate of transformation between the incremental public good and the private
consumption good in period t.
The decision-problem facing the government is to maximize the social welfare function presented in
equation (8), subject to the accumulation equation for the public good, the self-selection constraint and the
resource constraint given by equations (6), (9) and (10), respectively. The Lagrangean corresponding to this
optimization problem becomes
L = W +
￿
t































































4Since the government can control the private consumption and work hours by each ability-type via the tax system, it
is convenient to write the second best problem as a direct decision-problem (where the government decides upon private
consumption and work hours instead of tax parameters). This approach is standard in the literature on optimal nonlinear
taxation. See also earlier literature on optimal income taxation in dynamic economies; e.g., Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) and
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (in press).
4denote the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private consumption faced by ability-
type i of age a in period t and the corresponding marginal rate of substitution faced by the mimicker,
respectively. We can then present our main result as follows;5
Proposition 1 When the consumers have present-biased preferences, and the labor and capital income taxes











































Equation (12) means that the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the private
consumption good in period t, pt, should equal the sum of social marginal beneﬁts that this investment gives
rise to over time, which reﬂect the marginal willingness to pay for the public good by the consumers as well
as eﬀects via the self-selection constraint. This corresponds to the results derived by Pirttilä and Tuomala
(2001), yet with the exception that the self-control problem to be discussed below was absent in their study.
Note that the instantaneous social marginal beneﬁt in period t, SMBGt, reﬂects the marginal willingness to
pay by all three age-groups, i.e. the young, middle-aged and old, respectively, in period t. Also, the future
marginal beneﬁts of an incremental contribution to the public good in period t are not discounted directly by
the utility discount rate; instead, the quotient of present value shadow prices attached to the government’s
budget constraint, γt+τ/γt, serves this purpose, meaning that the weight that the government attaches to
future marginal beneﬁts will both reﬂect the pure rate of time preference, θ, and the relative marginal cost
of public funds (i.e. relative to the base year value γt).
We can see from equation (13) that the self-control problem facing the consumers aﬀects the policy rule
for the public good via the self-selection constraint; more precisely via the contribution to this constraint by
the middle-aged generation.6 The reason is that the consumer preference for immediate gratiﬁcation enters
the social optimization problem via the self-selection constraint only, because the paternalistic government
faces no such preference by assumption. Two interesting observations follow immediately from equation (13).
First, the preference for immediate gratiﬁcation weakens the contribution that the self-selection constraint has
on the policy rule for public provision. In a sense, therefore, quasi-hyperbolic discounting brings us closer to
(a dynamic analogue to) the ﬁrst best policy rule that would apply without asymmetric information. Second,
5Note that Proposition 1 applies irrespective of whether the consumers are naive (erroneously expect not to suﬀer from the
self-control problem in future periods) or sophisticated (in which case a consumer implements a plan that his/her future selves
will follow). For a more thorough discussion of naivety versus sophistication, see, e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
6Since MRSl
2,t = ￿ MRS
h
2,t, the corresponding eﬀect for the old generation vanishes. The reason is that the old consumers
spend all available time on leisure regardless of ability.
5it is only the preference for immediate gratiﬁcation facing the high-ability type, β
h, that aﬀects the policy
rule directly; there is no corresponding eﬀect of β
l. We summarize these observations in the following two
corollaries to Proposition 1;
Corollary 1. All other things equal, the preference for immediate gratiﬁcation faced by the high-ability
type, β
h ∈ (0,1), weakens the policy incentive associated with the self-selection constraint. The smaller β
h,
ceteris paribus, the weaker will be the incentive created by the second row of equation (13) to overprovide
(underprovide) the public good relative to the Samuelson rule if MRSl
1,t > (<) ￿ MRS
h
1,t.
Corollary 2. The preference for immediate gratiﬁcation faced by the low-ability type, β
l, does not aﬀect the
policy rule for the public good.
When the young high-ability type decides whether or not to become a mimicker, he/she attaches less
weight to the future utility consequences of today’s actions than he/she would have done in the absence of the
self-control problem (as the utilities facing the young consumer’s middle-aged and old selves are multiplied by
β




a fraction of the corresponding eﬀect that would follow without the preference for immediate gratiﬁcation,
which explains Corollary 1. Corollary 2 follows because the preference for immediate gratiﬁcation facing
the low-ability type does not enter the social optimization problem directly. In other words, self-control
problems facing mimicked agents (who are not potential mimickers themselves) will not modify the policy
rule for the public good. However, this does not mean that the level of β
l is unimportant; the low-ability
type’s self-control problem may still inﬂuence his/her choice of consumption-savings proﬁle and, therefore,
have important indirect eﬀects on the public good via the marginal rates of substitution in equation (13).
In the special case where δ = 0, in which the public good becomes a ﬂow variable, equation (12) reduces
to read pt = SMBGt, meaning that the forward-looking beneﬁt measure reduces to a static measure. The
qualitative eﬀects of quasi-hyperbolic discounting will, nevertheless, remain as in Corollaries 1 and 2: β
h
still aﬀects the policy rule via the self-selection constraint faced by the middle-aged, and β
l does not modify
the policy rule for a ﬂow-variable public good.
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